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Abstract. Securitization of immigration, the rise of interior immigration policing, and forces of carceral priva-
tization have occasioned a remarkable expansion of immigrant detention throughout the United States. Previous
studies have drawn attention to the importance of the daily rates paid by the federal government to individual
facilities in driving the emphasis on detention. This paper, in contrast, argues that tracing the political and eco-
nomic geography of money inside detention facilities is also critical for understanding detention expansion and
its consequences. We define the processes, mechanisms, and practices of generating profit above and beyond the
“per-bed” daily rate as “internal micro-economies” of migrant detention. Drawing on an ongoing examination of
migrant detention facilities in the greater New York City metropolitan area, we identify four micro-economies
evident in detention facilities: the commissary systems, phone and other forms of communication, detainee labor,
and detainee excursions outside detention. These economies show how detained migrants’ needs and daily rou-
tines are tailored in ways that produce migrants as both captive consumers and laborers. Recognition of multiple
micro-economies also highlights the fact that the numbers of individuals and entities invested in the incarcer-
ation of immigrants proliferate in tandem with the objectification of detainees. The paper further suggests that
attending to relationships embedded in the inner workings of detention exposes economic links across carceral
boundaries, rendering visible the porosity between government, private companies, and publics.
1 Introduction
Seemingly ever increasing numbers of immigrants in the
United States – and elsewhere – are incarcerated while
awaiting immigration and deportation hearings, in facilities
including county- and state-operated prisons and privately
managed detention centers. From 2005 to 2010, the num-
ber of migrants detained in the US increased from 280 000
to approximately 400 000 individuals annually. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (ICE) now detains an average
of 33 000 migrants on a daily basis (Office of Immigra-
tion Statistics, 2012). Indeed, Congress has put into place
a 34 000-detainee-per-day bed mandate, essentially requir-
ing ICE to aim for that number of detainees per day (Miroff,
2013).
Amidst ongoing, and famously contentious, efforts to re-
form the US immigration system, detention continues to be
a largely unchallenged keystone of enforcement policy, de-
spite evidence that there are much cheaper, equally effec-
tive, and less disruptive means for keeping track of immi-
grants prior to court appearances and deportation (Detention
Watch Network, 2014a). Justifications for immigrant deten-
tion over other options are typically couched in an overt logic
of national security whereby rationales of containing danger-
ous bodies, controlling membership in the nation, and pro-
tecting borders essentially become instruments used to pro-
tect and extend the power of the US state (Bigo, 2002; Fer-
nandes, 2007; Barry, 2009a). While these public discourses
of security are undeniably important influences, a growing
body of scholarly and activist research calls for consider-
ation of equal or perhaps more powerful hidden logics be-
hind the growing detention estate: economic gain. There has
been attention to privatization of the “migration industry”
Published by Copernicus Publications for the Geographisch-Ethnographische Gesellschaft Zürich & Association Suisse de Géographie.
336 D. Conlon and N. Hiemstra: Examining the everyday micro-economies of migrant detention in the United States
as a key driver of the expanding detention apparatus (Fer-
nandes, 2007; Golash-Boza, 2009). Private companies now
operate almost half (49 %) of all immigrant detention beds;
in contrast, private companies operate approximately 8 % of
state and federal prison beds (Detention Watch Network,
nd). Also, in this era of reduced federal support for local
and regional governments, immigrant detention has become
a revenue-generating strategy for many counties that open up
their existing prison system or work in partnership with pri-
vate corporations to build new facilities specifically for im-
migrant detention (Fernandes, 2007; Barry, 2009a).
With the increasing targeting of detention as a profit gen-
erator, there are increased demands for economies of scale
in the interest of maintaining cost-effective operations that
beget profit. Attention to the economics of detention tends
to be directed to the daily rates received by detention facili-
ties from the federal government: an average of USD 164 per
day, totaling over USD 1.7 billion per year (Detention Watch
Network, 2014a). We describe these rates as part of a macro-
level calculus, which plays a significant role in the continued
ideological drive for and financial investment in detention. In
this paper, however, we focus on additional ways in which
money is made from immigration detention. Within most de-
tention facilities – whether run by federal, state, or county
governments or private companies – many elements are fur-
ther contracted out to private entities. Drawing on an ongo-
ing examination of migrant detention facilities in the greater
New York City metropolitan area, this paper calls attention to
ways in which components of the infrastructure of detention
are used to exploit detainees and generate profit from migrant
detention. We define the processes, mechanisms, and prac-
tices of generating profit above and beyond the “per-bed”
daily rate as “internal micro-economies” of migrant deten-
tion. We identify four micro-economies, describe how they
are constructed and maintained within the spaces of deten-
tion, and argue that immigrant detention in the United States
is structured to effectively turn detainees into captive and
coerced consumers and laborers in ways that generate rev-
enue for a wide range of actors. Further, we illustrate that
attending to such hard-to-access spaces exposes economic
links across carceral boundaries, rendering visible the poros-
ity between government, private companies, publics, and the
everyday micro-economies of migrant detention.
The paper first reviews previous work on the growth of
immigrant detention vis-à-vis shifts in immigration enforce-
ment and border control policies. Paying particular attention
to the relationship between the expansion of immigrant de-
tention and private industry, we make the case for a focus
on the micro-economies of detention. Then, drawing on our
current research, we identify and explore four specific micro-
economies through which profits are extracted from detained
migrants: the commissary systems, phone and other forms
of communication, detainee labor, and detainee excursions
outside detention. The paper concludes by suggesting that
identification and analysis of everyday micro-economies of
detention facilities are essential to understanding – and un-
dermining – the expanding detention regime.
2 Detention privatization: an overview of macro- and
micro-level expansion of the immigration
industrial complex
While popular discourses link the expansion of immigrant
detention to border control and national security in the post-
September 11th era, the massive increase in numbers of im-
migrants detained and in the privatization of detention space
actually began in the 1980s. In 1984 the precursor to Im-
migration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), a division of the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) responsible for en-
forcement, entered into contracts with Corrections Corpora-
tion of America (CCA) and Wackenhut Services Inc. – now
GEO Group – to open the first privatized immigration de-
tention facilities in the US (Dow, 2004:97; Barry, 2009b).
Privatization again surged in the 1990s, fueled by passage of
harsh immigration laws in 1996 that expanded grounds for
the detention and deportation of undocumented immigrants.
In the wake of the attacks of 2001, in 2003, and again
in 2006, policies further criminalizing immigrants were put
in place which significantly expanded the potential deten-
tion population and, consequently, opportunities for profiting
from detention (Cervantes-Gautschi, 2010). These included
expansion of a class of offenses reserved for immigrants re-
ferred to as “aggravated felonies”, and the replacement of
“catch-and-release” programs with a “catch-and-return” pol-
icy (Martin, 2012). Mandatory detention while immigrants
await immigration status hearings is at the heart of both of
these changes. Another key shift entails the decentralization
and dispersement of immigration enforcement functions to
local communities, through programs such as 287(g), intro-
duced in 1996, and Secure Communities, introduced in 2008.
This shift in the geography of border enforcement – from the
border to interior spaces – produces an ever-widening swath
of sites, whence immigrants can come into contact with the
detention system (Coleman, 2007, 2009; Varsanyi, 2008). It
has also resulted in greatly increased demand for detention
bed space. The “geometric expansion of immigration deten-
tion” (Doty and Wheatley, 2013:427; Feltz and Baksh, 2012)
means record breaking numbers of individuals are detained;
for example, the 2012 figure of 478 000 immigrants detained
by ICE represented “an all-time high” (Simanski and Sapp,
2013:1) detainee population. With this, private corporations
such as CCA and GEO Group established themselves as
leading providers in the “immigration industrial complex”
(Fernandes, 2007; Golash-Boza, 2009).
Other factors, too, have been instrumental in bolstering
the role of private corporations in immigration detention.
For instance, in the 1980s the move to divest government
funds from detention – and prison space more broadly –
was welcomed in an era marked by tight fiscal budgets and
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the burgeoning embrace of neoliberalism, the prevailing “in-
stitutional framework characterized by strong private prop-
erty rights, free markets, and free trade” (Harvey, 2005:2).
In immigration detention, privatization was believed to fos-
ter greater flexibility to deal with a fluctuating detainee pop-
ulation (Barry, 2009a). Thus, today, privatization is a cor-
nerstone in the business models of corporations including
CCA, GEO Group, and Management and Training Corpo-
ration (MTC). Indeed, in 2006, the CCA president and CEO,
John Ferguson, told investors “we’ve never seen the wind at
our back like it is today” (cited in Feltz, 2008:30).
Academic scholarship and policy reports tend to focus
on macro-level issues in private immigration detention. Re-
search highlights the enormous increases in revenues for pri-
vate corporations generated by privatized detention. For ex-
ample, in 2010, CCA’s annual revenue was USD 1.69 billion,
an increase of 88 % over 2001 income levels. In the same
year, GEO Group reported annual revenues of USD 1.17 bil-
lion, a 121 % increase over 2002 figures (Justice Policy In-
stitute, 2011; Detention Watch Network, 2014a). The rela-
tionship between privatized profits and the daily cost of de-
tention borne by taxpayers via the federal government has
garnered critical attention. Feltz and Baksh (2012), for ex-
ample, highlight the relationship between campaign contri-
butions by corporations such as CCA and lawmakers’ po-
sitions on funding detention and related punitive immigra-
tion policies. Such lobbying efforts alongside the revolving
door of personnel and advisors between federal immigra-
tion enforcement agencies and private sector detention op-
erators illuminate the blurred boundaries between public and
private sectors in immigration enforcement. As more com-
ponents of the “immigration industrial complex” have been
turned over to private actors, there is increasing “lack of clar-
ity about who is primarily responsible for the humane care
of imprisoned immigrants” (Barry, cited in Kerwin and Lin,
2009:9). With this, advocates and researchers are compelled
to question and draw attention to conditions within detention
facilities. National and regional reports detail many of the
problems that detainees encounter routinely whilst detained
(see, for example, Amnesty International, 2009; N.Y.U. Im-
migrant Rights Clinic, 2010; ACLU, 2011). Issues identified
include the high cost and poor quality of access to commu-
nications, the quality and quantity of food service, and the
availability of adequate medical care. In addition to detailing
the inadequacies that pervade service provision in immigra-
tion detention, studies highlight the challenges involved in
holding private companies and contracted service providers
accountable to standards laid out in the Performance-Based
National Detention Standards (PBNDS), which were first im-
plemented in 2000, revised by the Obama administration in
2008, and again in 2011. Among the reports that precipitated
revision of the 2008 standards is an oft-cited review of con-
ditions in 25 detention facilities, authored by Dora Schriro
under the auspices of ICE’s Office of Detention Policy and
Planning (Schriro, 2009). The report identified the absence
of systematic information on agreements and renewals be-
tween ICE and contracted service providers in detention cen-
ters as well as a lack of consolidated records on “vendor per-
formance”. This remains an issue today and is impetus for
our current focus on the micro-economies of detention.
By focusing attention on detention’s internal micro-
economies, this paper augments burgeoning scholarship in
detention studies and carceral geographies (see for example
Tyler et al., 2014; Moran et al., 2013; Mountz et al., 2013).
We distinguish between macro- and micro-economies of de-
tention, even though, in practice, they are linked. The macro-
economy of detention refers to the most immediately appar-
ent exchange that takes place between the government and
corporations with privatization, that of ownership or man-
agement. This exchange is typically measured as the amount
the federal government pays “per bed” or “per detainee”.
It is regulated by law with a 34 000-detainee-per-day man-
date and can be investigated by pursuing contracts, federal
budget allocations, and corporations’ earnings and share-
holder reports. In contrast, micro-economies encompass ex-
changes that are linked to the infrastructure, everyday oper-
ation, and lived experience of detention. They embody what
Cindi Katz describes as the “messy, fleshy stuff of everyday
life” (2001:711) and, as such, exist at the scale of the de-
tention facility. Simultaneously, consonant with the politics
of scale (Marston, 2000), their reach extends into and be-
yond the everyday lives of detainees or a facility with links
to families, communities, and actors in political, economic,
and social spheres beyond a detention center. We can mea-
sure micro-economies by examining subcontracts for ser-
vices such as food and healthcare, when available, within
detention facilities. Yet, because they encompass lives and
livelihoods, these micro-economies are more than a numeric
measure. Given this, we want to not only highlight how de-
tention micro-economies expand profits for private corpora-
tions but also call attention to how they impact the experience
of detention. We are, thus, primarily concerned with investi-
gating the contention that “what the privatization of detention
does exceptionally well is to promote the commercialization
of detention and the production of a commodity – the de-
tainee” (Doty and Wheatley, 2013:434).
While there has been a good deal written about the expan-
sion and privatization of this system at the macro-level, there
remains a dearth of scholarly attention to the micro-level
economies of privatized detention. Without doubt, this is due,
in part, to the challenges of accessing these “closed contexts”
as research sites (see Koch, 2013; Belcher and Martin, 2013).
Furthermore, because private contractors are not accountable
to the public in the same way that government is, accessing
information can be extremely difficult, as we detail in the
following section. Nonetheless, in this paper we begin to fill
this void by sketching the complex array of services internal
to immigration detention facilities, which have been subcon-
tracted out and privatized. In this process, we demonstrate
how money is made by additional private sector actors be-
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yond those who dominate detention contracts at the federal
and state levels. Before turning to four micro-economies of
detention that exemplify our aims, we outline the methodol-
ogy used in our research.
3 On methodology
Our charting of four micro-economies comes out of an on-
going research project on immigrant detention in the New
York City (NYC) metropolitan area. Our study concentrates
on nine detention facilities that house immigrants taken into
custody in the greater NYC area (NYC, the part of New York
state to the east of NYC that is known as Long Island,1 and
eastern New Jersey), most of them in eastern New Jersey.2
Reflecting the pattern nationwide, the majority of these fa-
cilities are run by private corporations, or nominally run by
county governments who then contract with private compa-
nies. Of these nine facilities, large corporations like GEO
Group and Community Education Centers (CEC) are dom-
inant. The process of awarding the lucrative contracts for the
management of some facilities in this study has come under
scrutiny amidst charges of lack of transparency, cronyism,
and campaign contributions by CEC owners and New Jersey
elected officials (Lee, 2011; Wilwohl, 2011). Such charges
emphasize the profits at stake consequent to the privatiza-
tion of immigration detention. We focus on detention micro-
economies in an effort to better tease apart the various strate-
gies for maximizing these profits.
Our goals are threefold. One goal is to begin to identify
the range of entities attempting to profit from detention by
looking at contracts and subcontracts to do with the oper-
ation of detention facilities. The second goal is to identify
and trace additional ways in which money is made on deten-
tion, beyond the money exchanged through formal contrac-
tual agreements. To these ends, we are pursuing a number of
methodological strategies concurrently, some of which thus
far are more successful than others. We include a description
of the less successful strategies alongside the more successful
ones in order to illustrate the challenges that can be encoun-
tered when researching an industry that, typically, is opaque
and guarded (Belcher and Martin, 2013). The third goal is to
contribute to knowledge regarding the consequences of de-
tention privatization on migrant detainee experiences.
First, we are working to obtain facility-specific docu-
ments regarding contracts and subcontracts, standards, over-
sight and operations. While parties involved in detention op-
erations do not routinely make contracts and other docu-
ments available, there are laws at the federal and state lev-
els that require government agencies to fully or partially dis-
1Currently, immigrants taken into ICE custody in NYC and
Long Island are transported within 24 hours to eastern New Jersey
or upstate New York for detention.
2A complete list of facilities included in this study is available
from the authors.
close requested information and documents. In August 2013,
we filed two Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests
with ICE, and three equivalent requests, called Open Public
Records Acts (OPRA) requests, with counties in the state of
New Jersey. These requests asked for a wide range of con-
tracts pertaining to the operation of facilities, budgets, com-
missary lists, facility program and detainee work schedules,
lists of items issued to detainees, and detainee handbooks.
Unfortunately, and despite federal law requiring FOIAs to be
filled within 20 days of filing, our FOIAs were not filled until
October 2014 (right before this issue went to press; therefore
this article does not include review of the FOIAs). To date
only one of the three OPRAs has been filled; from this we re-
ceived almost 2000 pages of documents to review regarding
the Delaney Hall Detention Facility and the Essex County
Correctional Facility – both in Newark, NJ. The OPRA re-
quest documents we received are a rich source of informa-
tion, and we have triangulated these with other data (our in-
terviews, published reports by other organizations, and jour-
nalistic accounts).
Second, we are gathering personal accounts regarding the
inner workings of detention facilities. We conducted semi-
structured interviews with 15 people who have been inside
detention facilities themselves in different capacities, or who
have worked with detainees (during detention or after deten-
tion): lawyers, members of legal assistance and human rights
organizations, members of detention visitation groups, and
one former detainee.3 We asked participants questions re-
garding facility schedules, policies, and routines; different
entities they witnessed working in or in service of facilities;
detainee experiences, including personal needs, communica-
tion, work, complaints, and expenses; and observed differ-
ences between facilities. In addition, one of the authors par-
ticipated in a volunteer detention visitation program at one
of the facilities in the study, through which she observed the
spaces of the facility to which visitors were allowed and en-
gaged in informal conversations with detainees. To protect
the anonymity of participants (and organizations to which
they belong), we refer to quoted interviewees by their rela-
tionship to detention: lawyer, activist, or detainee. Finally,
we triangulate data gathered in the present study with the
growing number of published reports and media regarding
the conditions and consequences of detention privatization
(see, for example, Barry, 2009a, b; N.Y.U. Immigrant Rights
Clinic, 2010; Bernstein, 2010; ACLU, 2011). It is important
to note that while there is, of course, variety among the many
detained individuals and detention facilities, patterns emerg-
ing across facilities suggest there is notable consistency in
migrants’ overall experiences of detention.
3Identifying and successfully contacting former detainees has
proved the most challenging; the majority of detainees are eventu-
ally deported, and those who are released into the United States are
typically difficult to locate and also hesitant to discuss their experi-
ence for various reasons.
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4 Specific micro-economies
The act of detaining people, often for extended periods of
time, instantly creates a population with needs pertaining to
daily living to be filled, as well as generating a range of ad-
ditional services that must be provided in the management
and control of this population. In this section, we first ex-
amine commissary systems, through which detainees make
purchases, most of which, we argue, are necessitated by the
conditions of detention. The second micro-economy is com-
munication, where profits are made from detainees’ need to
communicate with the outside world in order to advocate
for themselves or simply to maintain family ties. Third, we
discuss how labor is extracted from detainees for the daily
maintenance of detention facilities. Though paid at rates that
barely register in the world outside detention, detainees often
clamor for these jobs in order to make necessary purchases.
Fourth, we consider the costs (and profits) related to detainee
transportation to and from detention facilities for services
that cannot be provided within.
4.1 Detention facility commissaries
Through examination of the micro-economy of facility com-
missaries, we see how detention providers make money by
not providing detainees with objects and services that they
need or desire, and withholding rights theoretically bestowed
by existing law. As signaled repeatedly by a number of re-
ports generated by human-rights-focused organizations and
journalists (see, for example, Amnesty International, 2009;
Human Rights Watch, 2009; ACLU, 2012), many facili-
ties provide the bare minimum of services required and of-
ten struggle (and sometimes fail) to meet rudimentary stan-
dards.4 Profits are undoubtedly increased in this lack; that is,
facilities do not pay for what they do not provide, thereby
leaving more of the per “bed” fee paid by ICE for profit. Im-
portantly, there is another consequence of the poverty of pro-
vision: the creation of consumer demand on the part of de-
tainees. This is a demand that can then be satisfied by selling
items to detainees, at a price set by the seller.
Our research indicates that detention facilities routinely
have some type of store, called a commissary or kiosk, that
sells items to detainees. Detainees typically make purchases
by filling out a request, as described in this excerpt from the
Delaney Hall Detention Center Detainee Handbook obtained
in the OPRA (page 41):
4Importantly, and despite the 2011 federal Performance-Based
Detention Standards discussed above, it is a system with only
“guidelines” in place for how facilities should be run and detainees
treated, little oversight, and rare enforcement.
VENDING MACHINES AND COMMISSARY
This facility has no vending machines for detainee use.
Commissary procedures are as follows:
– Detainees will be provided with a commissary order
form according to a schedule posted in the housing
area. Detainees shall complete the order form and sub-
mit it to the commissary officer at the posted pick up
time.
– The items will be brought to you at your housing unit on
the posted day.
– Commissary Lists of stocked items will be provided to
the detainees on a regular basis.
One participant who had been detained for 5 weeks at De-
laney Hall explains the specifics of how commissaries oper-
ate: “You get a list of available items, choose what you want
and put your code and name. They take the money out of
your account, and bring things to you on Wednesdays and
Fridays.” Advocates we interviewed, former detainees inter-
viewed after deportation (Hiemstra, 2012, 2013, 2014), and
numerous human rights organizations reports detail similar
purchase systems throughout the US detention system.
As a member of a human rights organization told us, the
commissaries can be seen by detainees as a “lifeline”. The
conditions of detention – how detainees are made to move
through highly prescribed daily routines – create high de-
mand for what the commissary sells. Perhaps the largest
demand on commissaries results from a common lack of
sufficient food. Also, as a former detainee complained, the
quality of the food can be poor: “The food is garbage, so
you have to buy extra.” The demand for supplemental food
also pertains to quantity. The advocate who described com-
missaries as a lifeline explained, “Food is horrible in facil-
ities, [detainees are] given portions so small that they are
frequently hungry.” The way in which meals are scheduled
may add to detainees’ desire to purchase food from commis-
saries. At Delaney Hall, for example, meals are at 6:45 a.m.,
12:00 p.m., and 5:00 p.m., with no food offered in between.
A lawyer who frequently enters facilities to meet with clients
suggested that such scheduling may be strategic in order to
encourage food purchases. Detention facilities have an un-
regulated ability to set prices, and data suggest that both
advocates and detainees perceive the prices as unfairly in-
flated. For example, a volunteer detention visitor reported,
“Detainees will call us on a regular basis and tell us how ex-
pensive the food is. Because they get such small portions and
it’s tasteless (it’s prison food), they’ll buy food if they have
money. . . [ramen] noodles they pay $3.00 for a small bag.
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They can buy rice, that costs about $5.00 a bag.”5 To provide
some comparison, bags of ramen noodles sold in a typical US
food store would cost between fifteen cents and one dollar.
Sales to these captive consumers are not limited to
food. Our participants described extensive commissary lists,
including toiletries, clothing, electronics, and recreational
items like games and cards. Again, the conditions of deten-
tion push detainees to make certain purchases. For instance,
while facilities are required to provide essential toiletries like
shampoo, soap, and razors, what is provided is often insuf-
ficient. Detainees quickly run out of the meager supplies,
or, as a former detainee explained, “they are poor quality
so most [detainees] want to buy.” Another common com-
plaint from detainees is that facilities are kept at low tem-
peratures (ACLU, 2011). Consequently, many want to pur-
chase long underwear to keep warm (Hiemstra, 2014). Addi-
tionally, many detainees are incarcerated for weeks and even
months. The monotony of life in detention fosters a desire
to purchase items for recreation. A man previously detained
in Delaney Hall explained, “Anything you want to do other
than TV you have to buy – cards, paper and pen for letter
writing, dominoes.” We provide these examples not because
of a high dollar amount, but because they demonstrate ways
in which the intimate details of detainees’ routines are crafted
– whether intentionally or unintentionally – in ways that turn
them into willing, even desperate, consumers with only one
outlet for their consumption.
4.2 Curtailing communication with the outside world:
phone contracts
The 2011 PBNDS state that “detainees shall have reasonable
and equitable access to reasonably priced telephone services”
(p. 359) and, further,
contracts for such services shall comply with all
applicable state and federal regulations and be
based on rates and surcharges comparable to those
charged to the general public. Any variations shall
reflect actual costs associated with the provision of
services in a detention setting (p. 360).
Our second micro-economy – communication and, more
specifically, phone contracts – illustrates that, for detained
migrants, reality is a striking contrast to these standards.6
Although phone services are provided invariably they are
available at exorbitant costs that frequently prohibit detainees
from maintaining links with loved ones, community advo-
cates, and legal representatives.
5The provision of food/cafeteria service is another important de-
tention micro-economy; discussing it here is beyond the scope of
this article.
6Email is another facet of this micro-economy that provides a
lucrative revenue stream for private companies; discussing it here is
beyond the scope of this article.
Like the prison system, in immigration detention, center
operators contract out telephone services to private commu-
nications firms. A handful of companies, including Global
Tel*Link, Securus, Century Link and Pay-Tel, dominate this
market. The services these companies provide are not propri-
etary, yet contracts awarded involve significant markups on
the cost of phone calls that migrants and their families must
bear. Interestingly, among the reasons for the high costs of
communication is not corporate greed per se; instead, they
result from commissions paid to local and state governments.
Subcontractors are invited to submit bids to county and state
governments to provide telephone and communication ser-
vices to detention facilities. It is common practice for bidders
to offer a menu of options, each with different price points
for local, intra-state, and inter-state phone calls. The differing
price points reflect different commission rates. For example,
our OPRA records indicate that commission rates for intra-
state and inter-state phone calls vary between 15 and 57 %
in one service provider’s bid.7 One activist notes, however,
that the lowest rates are “just window dressing” meaning bids
that have been awarded invariably use the higher commission
rates.
Local governments earn millions of dollars in connec-
tion with these commissions. For instance, in 2012, New
Jersey’s Essex County government, through their contract
with Global Tel*Link, received a commission rate of 54 %
on phone services to the county jail where immigrant de-
tainees are held; this translates into an annual income of
USD 925 000 received by the county government in associa-
tion with telephone commissions (New Jersey Advocates for
Immigrant Detainees, 2013). Profits are also generated at the
state level. As an immigrant rights activist whom we inter-
viewed noted, the costs of calls made from NJ state prisons
include a 41 % commission; consequently, the state govern-
ment makes between USD 3 and 6 million annually.
In practical terms this means that immigrant detainees
pay phone rates approximately 20 times higher than prevail-
ing rates offered by telephone service providers operating
outside detention (NJ Advocates for Immigrant Detainees,
2013). Even more concretely, one volunteer visitor noted that
a “15-minute phone call from New Jersey to New York costs
almost $15.00.” For comparison, the cost typically paid by ei-
ther a land line or cell phone user would certainly be less than
USD 2, and potentially even a fraction of that. As a result de-
tainees often feel compelled to earn money by participating
in so-called “voluntary” work programs within detention fa-
cilities where “one month’s wages would cover the cost of
a 15 min phone call to New York” (NJ Advocates for Immi-
grant Detainees, 2013:4).
7Local calls are typically charged at a flat per minute rate. Be-
cause detainees are often transferred from their place of residence
to out-of-state detention facilities, they must make intra-state and
inter-state calls to communicate with loved ones.
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Governments are not the only institutions profiting from
this micro-economy; private companies certainly garner sub-
stantial profits too. Communication with those outside de-
tention centers is available via collect calls or a calling card
system only. Detainees can purchase phone cards, usually on
a weekly basis, or a family member or contacts outside the
facility can add money to a detainee’s phone account. Private
companies add fees for every transaction in this process. For
example, detainees are routinely charged USD 5.00 to add
money to their account; they must put money on in certain
increments; detainees are not informed prior to a call what
rate they will be charged; if money on the account is not used
within a certain length of time it is forfeited; when detainees
are transferred to another facility they are charged to trans-
fer that money and then charged to open up an account at
another facility. Thus, at every turn detainees are subject to
“predatory phone rates” (CIVIC, 2013:2).8
For detainees the effects of this privatized, subcontracted
micro-economy are manifold. Not only do migrants suffer
greater isolation from the community than is already in-
herent within the reality of detention; in addition, the high
cost of communication places undue financial burdens on de-
tainees, their family members, and advocates who endeavor
to provide emotional and practical support to detainees. Ad-
ditionally, costly phone calls mean that access to legal rep-
resentation, already limited by being deemed a “privilege”
rather than a right (Amnesty International, 2009:30), is fur-
ther curtailed for many detainees. Because legal representa-
tion is crucial to positive outcomes in immigration hearings
(NYIRS, 2011) the inability to access legal support, which is
exacerbated by the high cost of communication, means that
more detainees end up being deported.
4.3 Detainee labor
There are a number of ways through which these captive con-
sumers obtain the money that they spend in detention. Some
detainees have family and friends who can send money for
their commissary account. Some have money on their person
when detained, which may then be deposited into their ac-
count. Without these funds, or when they run out, detainees
8It should be noted that in 2013 the Federal Communications
Commission issued a ruling in a 10-year-old case pertaining to the
high cost of phone calls in federal and state prisons (Wright vs.
CCA, 2000) with the result that a cap was placed on the cost of
certain calls. One telephone company (Securus) subsequently suc-
cessfully sued for a stay on implementing facets of the FCC’s rul-
ing; hence no further revisions will be made to cost structures un-
til further legal hearings ensue. Nonetheless, this case prompted
a similar campaign by immigration advocates for detained immi-
grants, and some facilities in NJ have renegotiated contracts for in-
state and inter-states phone rates in state facilities where migrants
are detained. While this is a welcome development, actual compli-
ance is uncertain; thus the impact for detainees remains unclear (see
CIVIC, 2014).
may be desperate for any opportunities to earn more money
to spend in detention. This is where “voluntary” work pro-
grams in detention facilities come in. Most facilities offer
some type of “employment” to detainees. The Delaney Hall
Detainee Handbook (p. 44), for example, states, “Every ef-
fort will be made to provide you an opportunity to partici-
pate in the voluntary work program.” The Essex County Cor-
rectional Facility Detainee Handbook (p. 39) includes, “All
individuals who are detained at the Essex County Correc-
tional Facility are eligible on a voluntary basis for available
ICE Detainee worker openings.” What’s more, Essex’s Hand-
book (p. 39) goes on to characterize working as a privilege:
“Work is a privilege that may be rescinded for not reporting
for work, appearing in an unsanitary condition, or perform-
ing unsatisfactorily.”
There are several important points to be made regarding
these work “opportunities”. First, detainees are typically paid
one to three dollars per-day, rates that have been upheld in
court (Moreno, 2012). Second, the work is often difficult,
taxing, and tedious – tasks such as cleaning, laundry, main-
tenance, or kitchen work. As a former Delaney Hall detainee
explained,
Those that work have to work very hard. For clean-
ing, start at 7 a.m. For kitchen, start at 6 a.m. – they
help cook, then clean in kitchen and in eating area,
finish breakfast at about 10 a.m., then at 11:30 have
to come back for lunch, repeat, then have to work
again for dinner.
Third, there is often not enough work to satisfy detainee
demand. Given the rate of pay and the difficulty of the work,
at first glance this fact may be surprising. If we return to the
purchases made by detainees described in the first two micro-
economies, however, this desire to work makes sense. As this
same former detainee explained,
Many more people want jobs than there are jobs
to have. There are only six to ten of each type of
assignment. But people want the jobs when they
don’t have any money. They will work a couple of
weeks just to be able to make a phone call.
Essentially, the way in which detention life is structured
means that detainees are eager for jobs that may earn them
as little as 12 cents (USD 0.125) per hour.
We want to emphasize here that while participation in
these so-called “voluntary” work programs is not overtly co-
erced – and indeed, presented as a privilege – the conditions
of detention mean that coercion can be disguised, concealed
by created consumer demand, by personal attempts to make
detention bearable. What’s more, detention contractors profit
in two ways on detainee labor. Labor for some of the basic
services for which they are responsible, such as food, clean-
ing, laundry, is achieved at significantly reduced cost to them.
One human rights organization employee we interviewed es-
timated that one 187-bed facility saved about USD 5 to 6 mil-
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lion per year. Then, the wages that they do pay detainees
come back to the detention providers when detainees pur-
chase things that the facilities sell (Fernandes, 2007; Moreno,
2012). Detention providers have created a remarkable system
for profit maximization by creating conditions that drive de-
tainees to make purchases at inflated prices, work for nearly
nothing, and then essentially return the bulk of their earnings
to the detention facility.
4.4 Captive on the outside
While the modus operandi of detention is to maintain de-
tainees inside of detention facilities, there are a number
of reasons that occasion mobility outside of the containing
walls. We identify several external movements as part of a
fourth micro-economy of detention because they entail sig-
nificant expense and effort for detention operators.
First, detainees are frequently transferred between deten-
tion facilities (Gill, 2009; Human Rights Watch, 2009; Hiem-
stra, 2013). Reasons for these transfers can include lack of
“bed space” at a particular facility, and moving a detainee
closer to a facility from which he or she will be deported.
Advocates claim that detainees are also transferred strate-
gically, such as to remove detained migrants from support
networks and legal assistance (Morawetz, 2005; Kanstroom,
2007; Human Rights Watch, 2009); or in retribution for be-
havior found disagreeable by facility managers, such as not
complying with requests, asking for additional privileges,
or attempted organizing (Dow, 2004; Gill, 2009; Bernstein,
2010). Data from our project support these previous findings.
For example, the director of a visitation program reported
that, “We are also getting calls from detainees who are be-
ing threatened with being moved if they don’t comply with
CEC staff.” Detainees’ final transportation within the deten-
tion system, of course, is for deportation.
Second, detainees must occasionally leave and return to
the same facility. These excursions may be for court ap-
pearances, visits to the ICE field office, visits to the mi-
grants’ consulate, and medical attention that cannot be pro-
vided within the detention facility. It is important to note that
efforts to minimize opportunities for venturing outside the
facility have significant consequences for detainees. For ex-
ample, many detainees’ “appearances” in court take place by
video. Advocates note that migrants’ lack of physical pres-
ence in front of a judge negatively impacts their case outcome
(Human Rights Watch, 2009). Additionally, management ret-
icence in allowing detainees to exit for medical care can have
dire consequences for their mental and physical well-being,
and is part of an ingrained culture in which detainee medical
needs are neglected (Bernstein, 2010; ACLU, 2011).
Still, detainees are sometimes transported to and from fa-
cilities. Our scrutiny of detention center contracts received
through OPRA requests shows that these excursions con-
stitute a significant expense. Costs include vehicles, vehicle
maintenance, fuel, and drivers. Different detention facilities
have different transportation arrangements and providers.
Transportation may be executed by ICE, the US Marshals
Service (particularly in the case of deportation), the entity
with whom ICE directly contracts (be it a county or pri-
vate company), or subcontracted by that entity to yet an-
other company. Individual facilities may purchase vehicles
for the transport of cargo as well as people. Symbolic of the
securitization of migration and framing of migrants as secu-
rity threats, in detention contracts, budgets, and billings we
have reviewed thus far, “transportation” (to wherever it may
be) includes the provision of armed guards to accompany
any transported and hospitalized prisoners, another impor-
tant component of this micro-economy. Our analysis of doc-
uments obtained shows that there is a welter of actors who
receive monetary compensation related to the extra-facility
transportation of detainees.
5 Conclusion
Securitization of immigration, the rise of interior immigra-
tion policing, and forces of carceral privatization have oc-
casioned a remarkable expansion of immigrant detention
throughout the United States. This paper has illustrated that
tracing political and economic geographies inside detention
facilities, in addition to exposing the direct links between
government money and detention facilities, is critical for un-
derstanding this expansion and its consequences. We have
explored four micro-economies evident in detention facili-
ties in the greater NYC area. These economies show that de-
tained migrants’ social reproduction – their needs and daily
routines – are tailored in ways that produce migrants as both
captive consumers and laborers. Theirs is a captivity borne
of a continued securitization of immigration, where migrants
are relentlessly criminalized and dehumanized in ways that
turn them into targets for the extraction of profit. Recognition
of multiple micro-economies also highlights the fact that the
numbers of individuals and entities invested in the incarcer-
ation of immigrants proliferate in tandem with the objectifi-
cation of detainees.
While this paper offers an important starting point, there
still remains a substantial dearth of research on the relation-
ship between the interior operations of facilities and the cen-
trality of detention in contemporary immigration enforce-
ment regimes. There are many additional micro-economies
which have not yet been examined. One, for example, is
the provision of all the various products required to main-
tain a large incarcerated population, from cleaning supplies
to foodstuffs to toiletries for detainees. There are myriad en-
tities that compete to attain such contracts (Fernandes, 2007).
Another is the vast number of individuals employed by de-
tention facilities – such as food service, maintenance staff,
and administrative personnel. There are other, more hidden
economies that develop as well. For instance, detainees may
also be captive targets for theft. Whether by design or, per-
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haps, due to the chaos of the detention and deportation ap-
paratus, detainees often lose money and possessions in the
system (Hiemstra, 2013). Also, as a result of their forced con-
sumerism, bartering economies develop among detainees, in
which skills, material items, and money are exchanged.
Another important area for future research is the varia-
tion in micro-economies between places. While this study
has focused on facilities in the greater NYC area, previous
studies suggest that there exist significant differences in de-
tention according to geographic location (Hiemstra, 2013;
TRAC, 2013). One recent report (TRAC, 2013) found sig-
nificant contrasts in detention durations on a state-by-state
basis, which is partly related to the changing geographies of
immigration enforcement discussed earlier. Future inquiries
should explore how detention micro-economies differ be-
tween places that routinely hold migrants for longer versus
shorter periods of time, and what these differences reveal. For
instance, do commissary and phone systems exhibit greater
development in facilities where migrants are detained for
longer periods of time? Variations between geographically
proximate facilities also need attention. Despite the existence
of guidelines intended to standardize facility operations and
procedures and ensure a minimum of care for detainees –
the 2011 Performance-Based National Detention Standards
(PBNDS) – there is a lack of nationwide oversight or uni-
form enforcement. This leads to tremendous variation in the
degree of compliance and, therefore, in the experiences of
detainees. Our research to date indicates that variations exist
not just from state to state, or county to county, but also from
facility to facility.
Our focus on the multiplying micro-economies operat-
ing in detention reveals the thin membrane that separates
carceral boundaries and effectively links public government
and institutions with private sector actors. This porosity is
troubling on many levels. In this paper we have highlighted
some of the effects for detained migrants. Detention micro-
economies are also entwined with the lives of loved ones and
thus spill out into communities beyond the boundaries of de-
tention centers. The ties between private and public sector
actors also make investigations such as ours more cumber-
some, yet also more necessary. Research becomes cumber-
some because private corporations are not accountable to the
public in ways that government is. As a consequence, access-
ing information necessitates greater persistence and more in-
ventive approaches to research. This research is also more
necessary precisely because governments are ultimately sub-
ject to public approval and accountable to their constituents,
and the increasingly entwined character of migrant detention
– from the macro- to the micro-level – means voters and tax-
payers have a stake in what goes on in migrant detention cen-
ters. Given this, voters can potentially call into question the
manner in which private corporations are profiting from the
detention of migrants at the expense of taxpayers and under
the aegis of voter assent. By identifying and scrutinizing de-
tention micro-economies, this paper provides fodder for such
questioning and, we hope, contributes to the project of under-
mining the expanding detention regime.
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